DePaul Journal of Art, Technology
& Intellectual Property Law
Volume 16
Issue 1 Fall 2005

Article 2

Trademark Nominative Fair Use: The Relevance of the "New Kids
on the Block Factors" After the Supreme Court KP Permanent
Make-Up v. Lasting Impression Decision
Carl Regelmann

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip

Recommended Citation
Carl Regelmann, Trademark Nominative Fair Use: The Relevance of the "New Kids on the Block Factors"
After the Supreme Court KP Permanent Make-Up v. Lasting Impression Decision, 16 DePaul J. Art, Tech. &
Intell. Prop. L. 1 (2005)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol16/iss1/2

This Lead Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital Commons@DePaul. It
has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

Regelmann: Trademark Nominative Fair Use: The Relevance of the "New Kids on

TRADEMARK NOMINATIVE FAIR USE: THE
RELEVANCE OF THE "NEW KIDS ON THE
BLOCK FACTORS" AFTER THE SUPREME
COURT KP PERMANENT MAKE-UP V. LASTING
IMPRESSION DECISION
By Carl Regelmann*
I. INTRODUCTION

In December of 2004, the Supreme Court announced in KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,Inc., that a
likelihood of confusion did not bar the affirmative defense of
descriptive trademark fair use under §33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act.'
This interest in descriptive fair use by the nation's highest court
encouraged a number of commentators to discuss the issue in
depth.2 However, in the Court's decision on the future of
* J.D. 2006, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. The author would like to
thank Megan Kossiakoff and the entire Journal of Art and Entertainment Law
for their amazing work, Professor Barton Beebe for his guidance, Mom and Dad
for their endless devotion, Molly for her unwavering support, and Donnie,
Jordan, Jonathan, Danny, and Joey for their inspiration.
1. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc., v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
124 (2004)
(In sum, a plaintiff claiming infringement of an incontestable
mark must show likelihood of consumer confusion as part of
the prima facie case, while the defendant has no independent
burden to negate the likelihood of any confusion in raising the
affirmative defense that a term is used descriptively, not as a
mark, fairly, and in good faith.). Id. (citations omitted).
2. See David W. Barnes & Teresa A. Laky, Classic Fair Use of Trademarks:
Confusion About Defenses, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
833, 834 (2004) (proposing "adopti[on of] a balancing test for classic fair use of
trademarks that allows a use only when the benefits of the descriptive use to
consumers and competition outweigh the harm to consumers from confusion
and to mark owners from damaged goodwill."); Nikki Pope, Still a Ball of
Confusion: KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression L Inc., 4 CH1.KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 289 (2005) (arguing that "the ruling further obfuscated
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descriptive fair use, they neglected a significant issue: How will
this decision affect nominative fair use?
In the 1992 case of New Kids on the Block v. News America
Publishing,Inc., the Ninth Circuit developed a three-prong test for
nominative fair use.3 Under this test, a defendant may be entitled
to a nominative fair use defense, "where the defendant uses a
trademarkto describe the plaintiff's product, rather than its own."4
Although a number of circuits have applied this test since its
inception and some circuits have specifically declined to apply the
test, very little has been written on the topic.'
The recent decision in KP Permanent eliminated one of the last
distinctions between descriptive and nominative fair use.6 After
trademark law, doing little to clarify the relation of 'likelihood of confusion' to
fair use").
3. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th
Cir. 1992)
([W]here the defendant uses a trademark to describe the
plaintiffs product, rather than its own, we hold that a
commercial user is entitled to a nominative fair use defense
provided he meets the following three requirements: First, the
product or service in question must be one not readily
identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so
much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably
necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the user
must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark,
suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark
holder.).
4. Id. (emphasis added).
5. The only significant article written on nominative fair use and the New
Kids on the Block decision was more than ten years ago and less than two years
after the decision. However, the author was prophetic in that he believed that
the nominative fair use defense was "largely duplicative [of descriptive fair use]
*

.

. making the nominative use defense unnecessary." In addition, the author

believed that "nominative use may be confusing." Derek J. Westberg, New Kids
on the Block v. News America Publishing,Inc.: New Nominative Use Defense
Increases the Likelihood of Confusion Surrounding the Fair Use Defense to
TrademarkInfringement, 24 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 685, 701-02 (1994).

6. Before KP Permanent, the Ninth Circuit held that a likelihood of
confusion barred the affirmative defense of descriptive fair use. See KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1072
(9th Cir. 2003) vacated by 543 U.S. 111 (2004). However, the three-factor
nominative fair use test in New Kids on the Block replaced the likelihood of
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the decision, a few commentators briefly noted that the Supreme
Court did not discuss how the decision will affect the
implementation of nominative fair use in the future.7 Due to the
Court's ambivalence on the future of nominative fair use, this issue
has already appeared in one law suit8 and will become a heavily
discussed issue before a standard approach for trademark fair use
is determined.
After reviewing the origins of nominative fair use, this article
argues that the nominative fair use test developed by the Ninth
Circuit in New Kids on the Block is confusingly similar to
descriptive fair use under §33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act. This
article also demonstrates that a number of courts have misapplied
the nominative fair use test, and both courts and commentators
have confused which tests and factors courts have actually applied.
As the Supreme Court's decision in KP Permanent eliminated one

confusion test. Id. Therefore, a likelihood of confusion did not bar the
affirmative defense of nominative fair use. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles,
279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002).
7. Pope, supra note 2, at 300 ("[I]t is important to note that the Court limits
its discussion and analysis to statutory fair use, leaving open the question of
whether its argument can be applied with any degree of certainty to nominative
fair use."). Id. The author also argues that the Court "specifically avoided...
the role of likelihood of confusion as it applies to nominative fair use" and notes
that "the Court has never recognized or addressed 'nominative fair use."' Id.;
Jonathan Moskin, The Unfair Case for Fair Use, MANAGING INTELL. PROP.,
Feb. 2005, at 80
(Other areas in which the Court's decision gives little express
guidance concern the scope of the fair use defence in cases of
[E]ven though the Ninth
parody and nominative fair use ....
Circuit decides [nominative fair use] cases without a full
likelihood of confusion analysis, not all courts do, and since
the defence is not specified by statute, it is unclear how it will
be affected, if at all, by KP PermanentMake-Up.).
8. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d
Cir. 2005). During the final editing of this article, the Third Circuit created a
new approach for nominative fair use analysis by creating a bifurcated approach
using the likelihood of confusion factors and a modified "New Kids test."
However, a lengthy dissent argues for a modified likelihood of confusion test to
replace the nominative fair use test and suggests that the majority's new test
"runs afoul of the Lanham Act, KP Permanent, [and] Prestonettes .
Id. at
250.
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of the few remaining distinctions between the two tests, this article
advocates the creation of a unified trademark fair use test under the
Lanham Act.
Part II traces the evolution of trademark nominative fair use and
the factors that courts currently apply. In part III, the article
analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in the descriptive fair use
case of KP Permanent and why this decision will affect
nominative fair use in the future.
Part IV explains when
nominative fair is not necessary and how any changes to the fair
use law will not affect certain trademark applications. In part V, I
will review how courts analyze the nominative fair use factors.
Part VI discusses the similarities between descriptive and
nominative fair use. Finally, part VII argues that there is no need
for two separate trademark fair use tests and proposes amendments
to the Lanham Act for a unified test.
II. HISTORY OF NOMINATIVE FAIR USE

A. Descriptive andNominative FairUses
There are two main categories for trademark fair use. The first
type of "fair use" in trademark law is "descriptive fair use," which
is also referred to as "classic fair use."9 Descriptive fair use is a
defense to trademark infringement when:
the term used by the actor is descriptive or
geographically descriptive of the actor's goods,
services, or business, or is the personal name of the
actor or a person connected with the actor, and the
actor has used the term fairly and in good faith
solely to describe the actor's goods, services, or
business or to indicate a connection with the named
person. '

9. 2 J.

THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §

11:45 (4th Ed. 2005).

10.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
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Section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act recognizes descriptive
fair use as a defense to an incontestable mark." Under
§33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act, use of an incontestable mark
is subject to defense when:
the use of the name, term, or device charged to be
an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark,
of the party's individual name in his own business,
or of the individual name of anyone in privity with
such party, or of a term or device which is
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only
to describe the goods or services of such party, or
their geographic origin. 2
Descriptive fair use has been applied to registered trademarks,
unregistered trademarks, common law cases, and under §43(a) of
the Lanham Act.' 3 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
descriptive fair use even applied "where a defendant has used the
plaintiff's mark only to describe his own product, and not at all to
describe the plaintiff'sproduct."'4
The second type of "fair use" in trademark law, and the one this
article will focus on, is "nominative fair use." Unlike descriptive
fair use, the Lanham Act does not contain a nominative fair use
defense and its implementation has developed entirely under
common law. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
nominative fair use applies when "the defendant uses a trademark
to describe the plaintiff's product, rather than its own."'" The
Ninth Circuit expanded this definition by indicating that, "[t]he
nominative fair use analysis is appropriate where a defendant has
used the plaintiffs mark to describe the plaintiff's product, even if
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)(2005).
12. Id. (emphasis added).

13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §28 cmt a (1995).
14. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) (ruling
that the Franklin Mint only used Princess Diana's name and likeness to describe
the Franklin Mint's statutes of Princess Diana); New Kids on the Block, 971
F.2d at 308 (emphasis added).
15. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (emphasis added).
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the defendant's ultimate goal is to describe his own product." 6
The definitions and analysis used in applying trademark
nominative fair use have evolved significantly over the past
century.
B. History of CollateralUse
The early application of "collateral use" by the United States
Supreme Court shows the foundation for the current nominative
fair use analysis. 7 In the classic 1924 collateral use case,
Prestonettes,Inc. v. Coty, Justice Holmes determined that a junior
user could repackage the senior user's perfume in smaller bottles
and use the senior user's mark "Coty" on the packaging to identify
the goods.1 " Justice Holmes declared, "[w]hen the mark is used in
a way that does not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in
the word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth."'" The Court
would not prevent the use of a trademark that describes a product
or service because, unlike a copyright, a trademark does not give
the trademark holder the right to prohibit the use of the word.2 °
However, the Court also indicated that if the junior user applied
the trademark in a print different from other statements found on
the bottle, the consumer could be deceived as to the seller.'
Therefore, under collateral use, the Supreme Court only permitted
junior users to use as much of the mark as was reasonably
necessary to.identify the product.
16. Cairns,292 F.3dat 1151.
17. Kenneth B. Germain, Feeling for the Foul Line: Fair Use is Fair,
Disparagement is Foul, Parody Hugs the Line, A.L.I., April 23-24, 2004
("[Nominative
fair
use]
primarily
is
a
non-statutory
concept,
traditionally/historically called 'Collateral Use' and "[m]ore recently, collateral
use has been recast as 'nominative fair use."').
18. Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
19. Id. at 368.
20. Id.("[A trademark] does not confer a right to prohibit the use of the word
or words. It is not a copyright.... A trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit
the use of it so far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale of
another's product as his.").
21. Id. at 368-69 ("If the name Coty were allowed to be printed in different
letters from the rest of the inscription dictated by the District Court a casual
purchaser might look no further and might be deceived.").
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The Supreme Court continued to clarify the scope of a junior
user's permitted collateral use in trademark cases. In 1947, the
Supreme Court permitted a junior user to apply the senior user's
mark on a reconditioned spark plug that was inferior to the original
part "so long as the [original] manufacturer [was] not identified
with the inferior qualities of the product resulting from wear and
tear or the reconditioning by the dealer."22 It seems as if the Court
did not want to permit the appearance of the original manufacturer
endorsing or sponsoring an inferior product. While the nominative
fair use doctrine has developed significantly since the decisions in
Prestonettes and Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, these

"collateral use" decisions considered some of the chief issues in
the current nominative fair use analysis. Courts continue to
analyze factors such as the quantity and manner in which marks
are used and whether the use will suggest sponsorship.
C. Origin of Modern Nominative Fair Use

1. Before New Kids on the Block

After the Lanham Act created a statutory descriptive trademark
fair use, courts elaborated on the requirements for a common law
nominative fair use. In 1962, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
acknowledged that, "[t]he Lanham Act does not prohibit a
commercial rival's truthfully denominating his goods a copy of a
design in the public domain, though he uses the name of the
designer to do So.''23 The Second Circuit refused to enjoin a
department store from using the term "Dior" to promote the sale of
garments copied from clothes originally designed by the House of
Dior.24 The court gave two principal reasons for their decision.
First, "it is difficult to see any other means that might be employed

22. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1947).
23. Societe Comptoir De L'Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v.
Alexander's Department Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1962) (emphasis
added).
24. Id. at 33.
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to inform the consuming public of the true origin of the design."25
Second, "no deception or confusion existed with respect to the
garments being sold or as to sponsorship by plaintiffs."26 Over
time, courts continued to consider these factors when determining
fair use.
A case decided twenty-three years before the seminal New Kids
on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc. decision on
nominative fair use analysis foreshadowed the current 3-prong
common law test for nominative fair use. In the 1969 case
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that an automobile repair business
did not infringe on Volkswagen's trademark rights by using the
term "Volkswagen" in advertising its repair business.2 7 The court
laid out three reasons for its decision. First, in advertising the
junior user's Volkswagen repair business, "it would be difficult, if
not impossible, for [the junior user] to avoid altogether the use of
the word 'Volkswagen' or its abbreviation 'VW,' which are the
normal terms which, to the public at large, signify [the senior
user's] cars."28 Second, it is appropriate for the courts to consider
"[t]he size, style and appearance of the advertising articles and
displays" and "the fact that [the junior user] did. not use
Volkswagen's distinctive lettering style or color scheme, nor did
he display the encircled 'VW' emblem." 9 Third, the junior user
"must not [advertise to the public] in a manner which is likely to
suggest to his prospective customers that he is part of
Volkswagen's organization of franchised dealers and repairmen."3
Other than describing the practice as a "nominative fair use" and
laying out a specific 3-part list that makes it "easy"3 1 for judges to
follow, this decision was almost identical to the nominative fair
use analysis used today.
25. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
27. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir.
1969).
28. Id.at 352.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See infra Part V and VII for discussion of whether the current 3-prong
test is actually easy to follow.
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2. The "New Kids Factors"
In 1992, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals laid out the
definitive 3-prong test for determining whether a commercial user
is entitled to a nominative fair use defense. In New Kids on the
Block, the junior user newspaper used the senior user's band name
ina "900 number" poll that cost fifty cents per call.32 The court
stated:
[W]here the defendant uses a trademark to describe
the plaintiffs product, rather than its own, we hold
that a commercial user is entitled to a nominative
fair use defense provided he meets the following
three requirements: First, the product or service in
question must be one not readily identifiable
without use of the trademark; second, only so much
of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably
necessary to identify the product or service; and
third, the user must do nothing that would, in
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder.33
The court found that each of the factors (herein referred to as the
"New Kids factors" or all three factors together as the "New Kids
test") favored the junior user newspaper and, therefore, the use did
not infringe on the senior user's trademark. First, there was no
other reasonable way of referring to "The New Kids on the Block"
as an entity without using the trademark. 4 Second, the junior user
"reference[d] the New Kids only to the extent necessary to identify
them as the subject of the polls; they [did] not use the New Kids'
distinctive logo or anything else that isn't needed to make the
Third, the
to readers."35
intelligible
announcements

32. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 304.
33. Id. at 308.
34. Id. ("It is no more reasonably possible, however, to refer to the New Kids
as an entity than it is to refer to the Chicago Bulls, Volkswagen or the Boston
Marathon without using the trademark.").
35. Id.
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announcements actually implied the opposite of sponsorship or
endorsements "by asking whether the New Kids might be a
'turnoff."' 3 6 While some courts have refused to rely on the "New
Kids factors" for nominative fair use,37 the Ninth Circuit," the
4
Second Circuit,39 the Fifth Circuit," and various district courts 1
have applied this 3-prong test when determining nominative fair
use. (See Table I in Appendix)
III. THE KP PERMANENT MAKE-Up V. LASTING IMPRESSION I
DECISION

A. CircuitSplit Over the Application of the Likelihood of
Confusion Test in Descriptive FairUse Analysis
Over time, the circuit courts applied the descriptive trademark
fair use test with different interpretations and this ultimately led to
differing results across the country. The main issue that varied in
the application of the test was whether the court should recognize a
36. Id. at 308-09.
37. See Century 21, 425 F.3d at 228 (determining that the Ninth Circuit's
"test as written suffers from a lack of clarity" and creates a bifurcated approach
involving the likelihood of confusion factors.); PACCAR Inc. v. Telescan
Techs., 319 F.3d 243, 256-57 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting the defendant would not
meet the second "New Kids factor." However, the Sixth Circuit only applied
the likelihood of confusion test and would not rely on the Ninth Circuit "New
Kids factors" nominative fair use test.); Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Loompanics
Enters., 936 F. Supp. 1232, 1241 (D. Md. 1996) (noting the defendant would
meet the "New Kids test" for use of two of the marks and fail the second "New
Kids factor" for the use of the Plaintiffs emblem. However, it declines to rely
on the test because it is not a statute and the Fourth Circuit has not adopted the
test.).
38. See Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 908-09 (9th Cir.
2003); Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1153-55 (9th Cir. 2002);
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002).
39. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2002).
40. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 546 (5th Cir.
1998).
41. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Premium Tobacco Stores, 2001 WL
747422 (N.D. I11.
2001); Liquid Glass Enters. v. Dr. Ing, 8 F. Supp. 2d 398,
402-03 (D. N.J. 1998).
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2
descriptive fair use where consumer confusion was probable.4 If
consumer confusion prohibited a descriptive fair use defense, this
appeared to put the burden on the junior user to "show absence of

consumer

confusion."43

This

called into question whether

descriptive fair use was actually an affirmative defense as
consumer confusion is necessary for trademark infringement.
Ultimately, the issue became so divisive that the Supreme Court
stepped in to determine how to apply the descriptive fair use test.
Before the Supreme Court KP Permanent decision, some
circuits determined that descriptive fair use was a valid affirmative
defense even if a likelihood of confusion was established. The
Fourth Circuit concluded that descriptive fair use was a defense
that was only necessary when infringement occurs, and thus
likelihood of confusion is established.4 The majority stated, "[i]f
a fair-use defense is not to be considered when there is a likelihood
of confusion, then it is never to be considered."4 5 This decision
was limited in scope, however, as the court found that a fair use is
less likely to apply where the "degree" of confusion is higher.46
The Restatement supports this holding.47 In addition, the Second
and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals have permitted a finding of
descriptive fair use where there is a likelihood of confusion.48 This
42. See KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 116 ("[The Ninth Circuit] took the view
that no use could be recognized as fair where any consumer confusion was
.
probable .
43. Id.
44. Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 110 F.3d 234, 243-44 (4th
Cir. 1997) (emphasis added) (dissenting opinion follows the Ninth Circuit
determination that no fair use defense is available if likelihood of confusion).
45. Id. at 243.
46. Id.
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §28 cmt. b (1995)
([A] defendant who uses a descriptive term fairly and in good
faith to describe its goods or services is not liable for
infringement even if some residual confusion is likely.
However, the strength of the plaintiff's mark and the extent of
likely or actual confusion are important factors in determining
whether a use is fair.).
48. See Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co.,
125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1997); Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc.,
64 F.3d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 1995).
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approach was very different from what some commentators
suggested and from how the Ninth Circuit actually approached
descriptive fair use analysis.
Before the KP Permanent Supreme Court decision, a few
circuits and commentators determined that descriptive fair use
should not apply when there is a likelihood of confusion. The
Ninth Circuit held that KP Permanent could "only benefit from the
fair use defense if there [was] no likelihood of confusion between
KP's use of the term "micro color" and Lasting's mark."49 A
leading trademark commentator argued, "it is inconsistent to find
both likely confusion and a fair use. Rather, 'fair use' should be
viewed as merely one type of use which is not likely to cause
confusion and hence is a 'defense' only in that sense."50
Descriptive fair use was also not available as an affirmative
defense in the Fifth" and Sixth52 Circuits where there was a
likelihood of confusion. (See Table II in Appendix)
B. The Effect of the Supreme Court's KP PermanentDecision on
Descriptive and Nominative FairUse Analysis
Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined that a likelihood of
confusion does not bar the application of descriptive fair use.5
49. KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1072; See also Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150
("[T]he classic fair use analysis only complements the likelihood of customer
confusion analysis."); Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1248
(9th Cir. 1984) (refusing to extend interpretation of fair use to include situations
where likelihood of confusion had been shown).
50. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 11:47.
51. See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791
(5th Cir. 1983) ("[A]nyone is free to use the term in its primary descriptive
sense so long as such use does not lead to customer confusion as to the source of
the goods or services.").
52. See PACCAR, 319 F.3d at 255-56 ("[A] finding of a likelihood of
confusion forecloses a fair use defense.").
53. KPPermanent,543 U.S. at 124
(In sum, a plaintiff claiming infringement of an incontestable
mark must show likelihood of consumer confusion as part of
the prima facie case, while the defendant has no independent
burden to negate the likelihood of any confusion in raising the
affirmative defense that a term is used descriptively, not as a
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The Supreme Court granted KP Permanent's petition for certiorari
to "address a disagreement among the Court of Appeals on the
significance of likely confusion for a fair use defense to a
trademark infringement claim, and the obligation of a party
defending on that ground to show that its use is unlikely to cause
consumer confusion."54 The Court stated that if Congress wanted
evidence of consumer confusion to completely bar descriptive fair
use, then Congress would have specifically stated this in § 33(b)(4)
of the Lanham Act.55 In addition, the Court agreed with the Fourth
Circuit's analysis of the affirmative descriptive fair use defense
and stated that, "it is only when a plaintiff has shown likely
confusion by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant
could have any need of an affirmative defense, but under [the
Ninth Circuit's analysis] the defense would be foreclosed in such a
case."5 6 However, the Court acknowledged that the method for the
future analysis of descriptive fair use is far from final.
In dicta from the KP Permanent decision, the Supreme Court
suggested other factors that courts may consider when applying a
descriptive fair use analysis. The Court was careful to limits its
decision by stating that while some likelihood of confusion is
permitted with descriptive fair use, likelihood of confusion may
still be considered when determining "whether a defendant's use is
objectively fair."57 The Court also hinted that "the door is not
closed" to other factors such as "commercial justification and the
strength of the plaintiff's mark."" While this decision will have an
immediate impact on how courts apply descriptive fair use, it may

mark, fairly, and in good faith.). (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 116.
55. Id. at 118
(It is just not plausible that Congress would have used the
descriptive phrase 'likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive' in § 1114 to describe the requirement
that a markholder show likelihood of consumer confusion, but
would have relied on the phrase 'used fairly' in § 11 15(b)(4) in
a fit of terse drafting meant to place a defendant under a
burden to negate confusion.).
56. Id. at 120.
57. Id. at 123.
58. Id.
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also have an impact on how courts consider nominative fair use.
Before the Supreme Court's KP Permanent decision, one clear
distinction between the descriptive and nominative fair use tests
was the effect of the results of a "likelihood of confusion" test.
While the Ninth Circuit held that a likelihood of confusion barred
the affirmative defense of descriptive fair use,59 the "New Kids
test" replaced the likelihood of confusion test when applying
nominative fair use.6" The court believed that "[t]he three-factor
["New Kids"] test better evaluates the likelihood of confusion in
nominative use cases" and "better addresses concerns regarding
the likelihood of confusion in nominative use cases."'" This
distinction was eliminated by the Supreme Court as the likelihood
of confusion is no longer dispositive of whether descriptive fair
use can be cited as an affirmative defense.
After the KP Permanent Supreme Court decision, descriptive
and nominative fair use are more similar than ever. Shortly after
the decision in Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Welles, and before the
KP Permanent Supreme Court decision, the Ninth Circuit
elaborated on the differences between descriptive and nominative
fair uses:
The distinction between classic and nominative fair
use is important for two reasons: (1) classic and
nominative fair use are governed by different
analyses; and (2) the classic fair use analysis only
complements the likelihood of customer confusion
analysis set forth in Sleekcraft, whereas the
nominative fair use analysis replaces the Sleekcraft
analysis.62
Now that the Supreme Court has determined that descriptive fair
59. See KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1072; Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1151; Lindy,
725 F.2d at 1248.
60. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002).
61. Id. Where a trademark is used nominally, the use is identical to the
plaintiffs mark. Using the Sleekraft test would most likely result in all
nominative uses being "confusing" since the test focuses on the similarity of the
uses.
62. Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150 (footnote omitted).
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use no longer simply complements the likelihood of customer
confusion analysis,63 the Ninth Circuit's rationale for a distinction
between descriptive and nominative fair use is limited to one
reason. However, is there any real difference between the analysis
of descriptive and nominative fair use? If so, are these differences
necessary?
IV. WHEN NOMINATIVE FAIR USE IS UNNECESSARY UNDER THE

LANHAM ACT

Before discussing whether a common law nominative fair use
test is necessary, it is important to distinguish situations where
nominative fair use is not normally considered.
A. When Use Failsto Meet Infringement Requirements

If a mark is not used in commerce, there cannot be a violation of
§ 32 or § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Section 32(1)(a) of the
Lanham Act states that for infringement, a person who does not
have the consent of the registrant must:
[U]se in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit,
copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in
connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services
on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive;
or [meet section (b)].64
Section 32(1)(b) has very similar requirements for infringement
including the "inten[t] to be used in commerce."65 Likewise, in §
43(a) of the Lanham Act, there can only be infringement where a
person "uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device" that "is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
63. See KP Permanent,543 U.S. at 124.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(a) (emphasis added).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(b) (2205).
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person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person."66 Therefore, under § 32(1) and § 43(a)(1)(A) of
the Lanham Act, there will be no infringement, and thus no need
for the nominative fair use affirmative defense, where a plaintiff is
unable to show that a defendant used the plaintiffs mark for
purely commercial purposes.
B. When Classic Fair Use Applies
The Lanham Act provides for the descriptive fair use defense
when the mark is used otherwise than as a mark. As is discussed
above in section 11(a), under § 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act, use of
an incontestable mark is subject to the descriptive fair use defense
when the mark is used "otherwise than as a mark" and in "good
faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their
geographic origin."67 Therefore, if a defendant is able to show that
the mark was not used as the plaintiffs mark, and it was used in
good faith only to describe the defendant's goods or services,
descriptive fair use will apply under § 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act
and nominative fair use will not be necessary.
C. When ComparativeFairUse Applies
When "comparative fair use" may be applied, nominative fair
use is unnecessary. A third type of affirmative defense not yet
discussed is "comparative fair use," which may only be raised for
dilution causes of action under the Lanham Act. Under § 43(c)(4)
of the Lanham Act, the following uses are not actionable for §
43(c) dilution causes of action: "(A) Fair use of a famous mark by
another person in comparative commercial advertising or
promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the
owner of the famous mark. (B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary."68 This is
different from descriptive fair use because it permits someone,
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2005) (emphasis added).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4) (2005) (emphasis added).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2005).
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other than the trademark owner, to use the mark as the actual
trademark. However, this fair use defense is not applicable to
infringement claims. Although there is substantial debate over
how to define non-commercial use for dilution claims, this defense
often succeeds where the defendant shows that the work is noncommercial, the trademark is used for purposes of parody, and the
trademark is not used to sell knock-off products.69

Therefore,

where there is a dilution cause of action and the mark is used for
comparative advertising, non-commercial purposes, news
reporting, or commentary, nominative fair use is unnecessary.
D. Art and Parody Under the FirstAmendment

The Lanham Act is "appli[ed] to artistic works only where the
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the
public interest in free expression."7 ° Courts have held that,
"literary titles [that use trademarks] do not violate the Lanham Act
unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work
whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title
explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work."71
As far as the content of works that use trademarks, the works enjoy
First Amendment protection.

In Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC,

Inc., without receiving permission, a magazine published a picture
of Dustin Hoffman from the movie Tootsie with different clothes
in the spring fashion section.72 The court found that where the
69. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F.Supp. 2d 1120, 1156 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 10, 1998) (using trademark "Barbie" in a song was non-commercial
and for purposes of parody. Therefore the defendant received summary
judgment for the dilution claim.); See also Girl Scouts of Am. v. Personality
Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (using slogan "be
prepared" underneath image of pregnant teenage girl in Girl Scout uniform was
a parody and not enjoined). But see Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding no parody in
pornographic film in which actress appeared in Dallas Cowboy cheerleader
uniform).
70. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
71. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999).

72. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir.
2001).
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speech does more than simply propose a commercial transaction, it
is not "purely commercial" and, thus, is entitled to full First
73
Amendment protection.
However, there are times when courts apply nominative fair use
to artistic endeavors. In Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods.,
an artist photographed Barbie dolls being attacked by vintage
household appliances.74 After applying the "New Kids test" to the
artist's works, the court found the use of the "Barbie" trademark to
be nominative.75 The court also acknowledged that the artist most
likely had a claim of First Amendment protection for his use of the
"Barbie" trademark as the mark has attained a significant cultural
status.7 6 However, the court did not decide the case on First
Amendment grounds as it was able to decide it on the narrower

73. Id. at 1185-86.
74. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir.
2003)
([The artist] produce[d] photographs with social and political
overtones.
In 1997, Forsythe developed a series of 78
photographs entitled 'Food Chain Barbie,' in which he
depicted Barbie in various absurd and often sexualized
positions. Forsythe use[d] the word 'Barbie' in some of the
titles of his works. While his works var[ied], Forsythe
generally depict[ed] one or more nude Barbie dolls juxtaposed
with vintage kitchen appliances.
For example, 'Malted
Barbie' feature[d] a nude Barbie placed on a vintage Hamilton
Beach malt machine.) (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 811-12 ("Critical works are much less likely to have a perceived
affiliation with the original work ... We hold that [the artist's] use of Mattel's
Barbie qualifies as nominative fair use.") (citing New Kids on the Block, 971
F.2d at 309).
76. Id. at 807. The court noted that:
[W]hen marks 'transcend their identifying purpose' and 'enter
public discourse and become an integral part of our
vocabulary,' they 'assume[] a role outside the bounds of
trademark law.' Id. (quoting MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 900.
Further, "where a mark assumes such cultural significance,
First Amendment protections come into play.
In these
situations, the trademark owner does not have the right to
control public discourse whenever the public imbues his mark
with a meaning beyond its source-identifying function. Id.
(citations omitted).
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ground of nominative fair use." Therefore, while nominative fair
use may be applied to artistic works that utilize trademarks, it is
generally only because it is easier to permit the artistic expression
through trademark nominative fair use than through First
Amendment law. If an artist fails on nominative fair use grounds,
they could still rely on First Amendment protection.
V. How COURTS ANALYZE NOMINATIVE FAIR USE
After the KP Permanent Supreme Court decision, one of the
only remaining distinctions between nominative and descriptive
fair use is the difference in the analysis of the common law "New
Kids test" and the §33(b)(4) Lanham Act descriptive fair use
affirmative defense.
However, when closely analyzed, it is
questionable how different these tests really are.
A. Nominative Fair Use Factor1: Not Readily Identifiable
Without Use of the Trademark
The first factor in the "New Kids test" is that "the product or
service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use
of the trademark."78
In New Kids on the Block, the court
determined that there was no other reasonable means of referring
to the musical group without using the trademark "The New Kids
on the Block."7 9 Courts have held that the first factor was met for
numerous terms including "Princess Diana, '. ° "The Beach Boys,"8!

77. Id. at 808 n.14 ("By instead employing the nominative fair use test which, incidentally works well in a case like this - we are following the timehonored tradition of avoiding constitutional questions where narrower grounds
are available.") (citations omitted).
78. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308.
79. Id. (asking "[H]ow could someone not conversant with the proper names
of the individual New Kids talk about the group at all?").
80. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[O]ne
might refer to 'the English princess who died in a car crash in 1997,' but it is far
simpler (and more likely to be understood) to refer to 'Princess Diana."').
81. Jardine, 318 F.3d at 908 ("[It is] virtually impossible to refer to the
Beach Boys without using the trademark.").
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and "Godzilla."82 Of the three nominative fair use factors, this
appears to be the easiest factor for the courts to apply. With only
two exceptions, to the author's knowledge, every time courts
applied the "New Kids test" in nominative fair use cases, the
trademark met the first prong. However, both exceptions involved
litigation of the same powerful trademark.
According to the author's research, the only trademark that
failed to meet the first factor of the "New Kids test" is variations
In the first example, without
on the trademark "Playboy."
receiving permission from Playboy Enterprises, a former
"Playmate of the Year" used the Playboy trademark in four
different areas of her personal commercial website: 1) The
metatags (for search engine identification), 2) The masthead of the
website, 3) Banner advertisements (which may be transferred to
other websites), and 4) "[T]he repeated use of the abbreviation
"PMOY '81" [for "Playmate of the Year 1981"] as the watermark
on the pages of the website. '' 83 The court found that the use of the
terms "Playboy," "Playmate," "Playmate of the Year 1981," and
"Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981" all met the first prong for
their use in the metatags, the masthead, and the banner
advertisements. 84 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's
explanation that "[t]here [was] no other way that Ms. Welles
[could] identify or describe herself and her services without
venturing into absurd descriptive phrases."85 However, the court's
82. Toho Co., Ltd. v. William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1211

(C.D. Cal. 1998) ("The product (the Godzilla character) is one not readily
identifiable without the use of the trademark. A 'giant sized pre-historic
dragon-like monsters [sic.]' may be an adequate description of Plaintiffs
product, but use of the 'Godzilla' mark is required to readily identify Plaintiffs
product.").
83. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802-03 (9th Cir. 2002).

84. Id. at 800-04 (stating that for the masthead and banner advertisements,
"[j]ust as the newspapers in New Kids could only identify the [New Kids on the
Block] clearly by using its trademarked name, so can Welles only identify
herself clearly by using [the Plaintiff s] trademarked title.").

85. Id. at 802 (adding, "[t]o describe herself as the 'nude model selected by
Mr. Hefner's magazine as its number-one prototypical woman for the year
1981' would be impractical as well as ineffectual in identifying Terri Welles to
the public.") (quoting PEI v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1079 (S.D. Cal.

1999)).
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analysis of the repeated use of "PMOY '81" ended in a different
result.
The first reason the use of "PMOY '81" failed the first factor of
the "New Kids test" is because of its repetition. The court stated,
"[t]he repeated depiction of "PMOY '81" [was] not necessary to
describe Welles. "'Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981' [was]
quite adequate."86 It appears from this statement as though the
court misapplied the "New Kids test." The use of the word
"repeated" in the first sentence suggests that the repetition of the
term is the reason it failed the first factor. This is supported by the
use of the word "adequate" in the second sentence.
Both
"repeated" and "adequate" are terms that refer to quantities of the
mark that may be used. If the court rejected the first factor for a
reason other than the quantity of the depictions, the use of the
word "repeated" would be mere surplusage. However, the first
prong of the "New Kids test" does not have any words that refer to
the quantity of the use. The first factor only deals with whether or
not a term can be identified without use of the trademark. On the
other hand, the second prong of the "New Kids test" does refer to
the quantity of the use: "[O]nly so much of the mark or marks may
be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or
service."87 This argument is supported by the Ninth Circuit itself
when they cited their "first prong analysis" in Welles as a citation
in their "second prong analysis" in Cairns v. Franklin Mint
88
Company.
In Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., the court applied the first
factor of the "New Kids test" correctly in a similar situation.89
Under the first factor, the use of terms other than "Barbie" will not
be sufficient to specifically parody the product "Barbie." 9 Under
the second factor, referring to the quantity of the use of the term
"Barbie," "the repeated use of the words "Barbie" and "Ken" are
86. Id. at 804 (emphasis added).
87. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (emphasis added).
88. See Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1154. The court compared the Welles first factor
analysis to the second factor analysis in MCA Records. Interestingly, one of the
circuit judges sat for both cases. Id.
89. See MCA Records, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
90. Id. ("First, defendants cannot effectively parody or comment on the
Barbie doll without mentioning her by name.").
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reasonably necessary for the purposes of parody."'" While use of
the term "PMOY '81" may not have been a nominative fair use
due to its repetition, according to the "New Kids test," this should
have been addressed under the second factor in Welles. In
addition, even if the court determined that "PMOY '81" was
simply an impermissible variation on "Playboy Playmate of the
Year 1981" under the first factor, it failed to explain why the
variations of "Playmate" and "Playmate of the Year 1981" were
permissible.
The second reason the use of "PMOY '81" failed the first factor
of the "New Kids test" is because it did not appear to describe
Welles. The court stated, "the term ["PMOY '81"] does not even
appear to describe Welles - her name or likeness do not appear
before or after each 'PMOY '81. ' '9' It was arguable that the
abbreviation "PMOY" was not entitled to trademark protection.
However, for the purposes of the case, the court accepted that the
term "PMOY" was entitled to protection. 93 Therefore, this would
suggest that "PMOY '81" was entitled to the same protection as
the terms "Playboy," "Playmate," "Playmate of the Year 1981,"
and "Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981." However, the court
was inconsistent in its analysis. When discussing the nominative
fair use of these other terms, the court did not consider the
proximity of Welles's name or likeness.94 For example, when
analyzing the metatags, there was no indication that Welles's name
was included next to the terms "Playboy" and "Playmate" that
were specifically included so search engine results would include
her site in search results. 95 In addition, even if every other use of
the trademark were in close proximity to Welles's name or
likeness, if "PMOY '81" was used as the wallpaper, then the
phrase would appear on the computer screen next to the images
and descriptions of Welles in the actual content of the website. In

91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. Welles, 279 F.3d at 804.
93. Id. ("Accepting, for the purposes of this appeal, that the abbreviation
'PMOY' is indeed entitled to protection, we conclude that the repeated, stylized
use of this abbreviation fails the nominative use test.").
94. See id. at 802-04.
95. See id at 803.
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other words, it is difficult to determine where the content on the
wallpaper ends, and the content on the actual site (with Welles's
name and likeness) begins.
In the second example, nearly two years after Welles, the Ninth
Circuit found Netscape's use of the trademarks "Playboy" and
"Playmate" for "keying" purposes to have violated the first prong
of the "New Kids test."96 In Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp., Netscape "keyed" terms that "allow[ed]
certain [Internet] advertisers to target individuals with certain
interests by linking advertisements to pre-identified terms."9 7
Netscape "keyed" adult-oriented entertainment advertisers to lists
of adult-oriented and sexual terms including "Playboy" and
"Playmate." 98
In addition to using the trademarked terms,
Netscape "[required all] adult-oriented companies to link their ads
to [the set of words including 'Playboy' and 'Playmate.'] 99
Despite acknowledging that certain uses of "Playboy" in
Netscape's "keying" system could be permitted under nominative
fair use, the court found that Netscape failed the first "New Kids
factor" because the advertisements displayed did not have a label
or comparison to Playboy Enterprises, Inc. °°
The court

96. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,
1030 (9th Cir. 2004) (It is interesting to note that in both Welles and Netscape,
the same panel decided the case (Judges Fletcher, Nelson, and Berzon) and both
opinions were written by the same judge (Judge Nelson)).
97. Id. at 1022-23
(To take an innocuous example [of 'keying'], a person who
searches for a term related to gardening may be a likely
customer for a company selling seeds. Thus, a seed company
might pay to have its advertisement displayed when searchers
enter terms related to gardening. After paying a fee to
[Netscape], that company could have its advertisements
appear on the page listing the search results for gardeningrelated terms: the ad would be "keyed" to gardening-related
terms.).
98. Id. at 1023. The lists included over 400 terms besides "Playboy" and
"Playmate." "Thus, when a user types in "Playboy," "Playmate," or one of the
other listed terms, those companies' banner ads appear on the search results
page." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1030.
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acknowledged that the use of Playboy's marks that resulted in the
listing of Playboy owned sites, or other sites that are permitted to
use Playboy's marks, were not at issue.'0 1 The court made this
distinction so it would remain consistent with its decision in
Welles where it found nominative fair use when the Defendant
used the same trademarks in the metatags of her website without
the permission of Playboy Enterprises, Inc."0 2 The court also stated
that it was not considering situations where the advertisements
clearly identified source.0 3 However, by narrowing the analysis of
the situation before actually applying the "New Kids test," the
Ninth Circuit virtually applied the second and third "New Kids
factors."
The Ninth Circuit misapplied the first "New Kids factor" in
Netscape and should have decided the case based on the second or
third factor. The court contradicts itself in Netscape by implying
that "Playboy" can be used in some aspects of "keying," and then
stating that Netscape's use in particular situations did not meet the
first "New Kids factor."'0 4 If the term "Playboy" can be used for
certain types of "keying," but not other types, it is the use of the
mark that should be at issue, and not the mark itself. In this case,
the court clearly felt that Netscape used the trademarks more than
was reasonably necessary as every adult-oriented advertiser was
"keyed" to the marks.0 5 This excessive use of the mark would
have failed the second "New Kids factor" because not every adultoriented advertiser had to be "keyed" to the marks.0 6 In Netscape,
101. Id. (noting "that defendants' use of [the Plaintiffs] marks to trigger the
listing of [the Plaintiffs] sites, and other sites that legitimately use [the
Plaintiffs] marks, is not at issue here") (citation omitted).
102. Welles, 279 F.3d at 803 ("Applying the three-factor test for nominative
use, we conclude that the use of the trademarked terms in Welles' metatags is
nominative.").
103. Netscape, 354 F.3d at 1030 ("[W]e are not addressing a situation in
which a banner advertisement clearly identifies its source with its sponsor's
name, or in which a search engine clearly identifies a banner advertisement's
source.") (footnote omitted).
104. See id. ("The situation with which we are dealing runs afoul of the first
requirement for nominative use."); see supra text accompanying note 101.
105. See supra text accompanying note 99.
106. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 ("[O]nly so much of the
mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or
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the court also clearly felt that Netscape "keyed" the marks to
advertisements with no identification of source which would lead
viewers to believe that Playboy Enterprises sponsored the banner
advertisements." 7 This use of the marks would have failed the
third "New Kids factor" as Netscape "keyed" many adult-oriented
advertisements to the marks which suggested sponsorship by
Playboy Enterprises, Inc."°8 Therefore, Netscape's use should not
have been deemed nominative, but not because it failed the first
"New Kids factor."
The first prong of the "New Kids test" is useless and should be
eliminated as a factor when determining nominative fair use. If a
product or service is identifiable without the use of a trademark, a
party will use a generic term, there will be no infringement claim,
and thus no need for a nominative fair use defense and the first
prong. On the other hand, where the specific product or service is
not identifiable without the use of a trademark, the courts have
found that every trademark has passed the first prong. The only
exceptions to this are the Welles and Netscape decisions where the
court improperly applied the "New Kids test" for the "Playboy"
trademark. As not one decision in thirteen years should have
turned on the first factor, and there is no clear hypothetical
situation (to the author's knowledge) where it could affect the
outcome of the "New Kids test," it should be eliminated.
B. Nominative Fair Use Factor2: Only So Much of the Mark that
is Reasonably Necessary
The second factor in the "New Kids test" is that "only so much
of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to
identify the product or service."'0 9 In New Kids on the Block, the

Court determined that the newspaper only used the mark "to the
extent necessary to identify them as the subject of the polls" and
service.").
107. See supra text accompanying note 103.
108. Netscape, 354 F.3d at 1023; cf New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308
("[T]he user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest

sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.").
109. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308.
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did "not use the New Kids' distinctive logo."' l ° A number of other
trademark uses have also passed the second prong. For example,
multiple references to "Princess Diana" in a statute
advertisement,"' a single use of the name "Lew Alcindor" in a car3
commercial," 2 and repeated use of "Barbie" in a parody song"
have all been deemed as "reasonably necessary" to identify the
product or service. However, unlike the first prong of the "New
Kids test," multiple nominative fair use cases have turned on the
second prong of the nominative fair use test.
The application of the second factor of the "New Kids test" is
distinguishable from the application of the first factor because the
Ninth Circuit has determined that nominative fair use may be
based on its outcome. Well before the introduction of the "New
Kids test," the Ninth Circuit found that the use of a plaintiff's logo,
"distinctive lettering style[,] or color scheme" should be
considered when determining fair use." 4 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals used this same analysis in the second factor of the
"New Kids test" and found that the use of the mark "Godzilla"
failed the second prong because the defendant's use of the
plaintiffs lettering style "exceed[ed] its legitimate referential
purpose.""..5 Similarly, as discussed above, if the Ninth Circuit had
110. Id.
111. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[A]
caption reading "Diana" is "reasonably necessary" to identify Princess Diana.
Similarly, a photograph showing Princess Diana wearing her royal tiara and
bolero jacket is "reasonably necessary" to identify these accessories of Princess
Diana.").
112. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 412-13
(9th Cir. 1996) ("General Motors could not refer to plaintiff without using his
name, and it used no more than was necessary to refer to him.").
113. MCA Records, 28 F.Supp. 2d at 1142 ("[T]he repeateduse of the words
"Barbie" and "Ken" are reasonably necessary for the purposes of parody.")
(emphasis added).
114. Volkswagenwerk, 411 F.2d at 352 ("Another [factor] was the fact that
[the defendant] did not use Volkswagen's distinctive lettering style or color
scheme, nor did he display the encircled 'VW' emblem.") aff'd, 413 F.2d 1126
(9th Cir. 1969).
115. Toho Co., Ltd. v. William Marrow & Co., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206,
1211 ("The cover of the [defendant's] book contains [the plaintiff's] trademark
in bold orange lettering prominently displayed. This prong of the test does not
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properly applied the test, nominative fair use would have turned on
the second factor in Welles as the repeated depiction of "PMOY
'81" would not have been "reasonably necessary to identify" Terri
Welles.1 6
The second prong appears to be similar to the "used fairly and in
good faith" descriptive fair use requirement in § 33(b)(4) of the
Lanham Act. It is arguable that the use of the lettering style in
Toho Co., Ltd. v. William Morrow and Co., Inc. and the repetitive
use of "PMOY '81" in Welles was intended to confuse the reader
as to the source of the product or service. As the district court
stated in Toho, "[t]he second prong ... appears to derive from a
concern that confusion as to affiliation may result if the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark exceeds its legitimate
referential purpose.""' 7 In other words, this may not have been
used in "good faith." However, it is also necessary to consider the
third prong before analyzing the similarities between the
descriptive and nominative fair use tests.
C. Nominative FairUse Factor3: Nothing that Suggests
Sponsorship or Endorsement
The third factor in the "New Kids test" is that "the user must do
nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder."'1'
In New
Kids on the Block, the court determined that the announcements in
the newspaper did not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the
musical group." 9
A number of trademark uses have been
determined not to suggest sponsorship or endorsement under the
appear to be satisfied because [the defendant's] use exceeds its legitimate
referential purpose.").
116. Welles, 279 F.3d at 804; See supra Section V(A); See also Cairns, 292
F.3d at 1154 (citing Welles decision under the second prong analysis).
117. Toho,33F. Supp.2dat 1211.
118. New Kids on the Block v. News. Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308
(9th Cir. 1992).
119. Id. at 308-09 ("[N]othing in the announcements suggests joint
sponsorship or endorsements by the New Kids. The USA Today announcement
implies quite the contrary by asking whether the New Kids might be 'a turn
off.'").
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third "New Kids factor." For example, use of "Playboy Playmate
of the Year 1981" on the masthead of Terri Welles's website with
a disclaimer,"' "Princess Diana" in a statute advertisement without
the term "authorized,"

'

and "Barbie" in a parody song with a

disclaimer on a CD case,'22 have not suggested sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holders. However, nominative fair
use has turned on the third factor where courts found a suggestion
of sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner.
The application of the third factor of the "New Kids test" is
distinguishable from the application of the first factor as Ninth
Circuit nominative fair use decisions have relied on whether there
is a suggestion of sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark
owner. Use of "The Beach Boys" by a single member of the
musical group failed the third prong of the "New Kids test"
because it suggested sponsorship by the entire group.'23 In
addition, use of the name "Lew Alcindor" in an automobile
120. Welles, 279 F.3d at 803 ("[I]t would be unreasonable to assume that
[Playboy] currently sponsors or endorses someone who describes herself as a
'Playboy Playmate of the Year in 1981.' The designation of the year ...shows
that any sponsorship or endorsement occurred in the past .... Inaddition...
Welles affirmatively disavows any sponsorship or endorsement [with a clear
disclaimer].").
121. Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1154-55
(None of Franklin Mint's advertisements for its Diana-related
products claim that these products are sponsored or endorsed
by the [Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial] Fund ...
Franklin Mint's advertisements for some of its other celebrityrelated products in the same catalogue do state that they are
"authorized" by a trademark holder. The absence of similar
statements in Franklin Mint's advertisements for its Dianarelated products suggests that they are not sponsored or
endorsed by the Fund.).
122. MCA Records, 28 F.Supp. 2d at 1142 (The "album identifies on the CD
case that the song 'is a social comment and was not created or approved by the
makers of the doll'. . . . This warning suggests that defendants attempted to
disassociate themselves from Mattel ....
").
123. Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 908 (9th Cir. 2003)
("[The defendant's] promotional materials display "The Beach Boys" more
prominently and boldly than "Family and Friends," suggesting sponsorship by
the Beach Boys." There is also evidence that the name was used "to create or
enhance marquee value.").
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advertisement, 2 and the name and image of a surfer in a clothing
advertisement, 125 have been deemed issues of fact that could result
in a failed nominative fair use defense because their use may have
implied endorsement or sponsorship.
While the Ninth Circuit has not required a disclaimer by the
junior user in order to meet the third prong of the nominative fair
use test, it appears as though the court has relied heavily on their
presence in cases after New Kids on the Block. In Welles, the
Ninth Circuit stated that while they recognized the affirmative
disclaimer that there was no sponsorship by Playboy Enterprises,
Inc., affirmative disclaimers are not necessary to establish
nominative fair use.'26 This was consistent with its decisions in
MCA Records where the court relied on a CD disclaimer to
determine sponsorship under the third "New Kids factor."' 27 In

Cairns, while the Ninth Circuit found no suggestion of
sponsorship or endorsement even without a disclaimer, the court
found the absence of a disclaimer for the "Diana" doll suggested
no sponsorship because the catalog was full of figurines that were
specifically "authorized" by trademark holders. 128 Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit still relied on disclaimers to determine sponsorship
under the third factor. On the other hand, in cases where the court
124. Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 413 (9th Cir. 2003)
(determining that the third prong was a question of fact for the jury because:
use of celebrity endorsements in television commercials [was]
so well established by commercial custom that a jury might
find an implied endorsement in [the defendant's] use of the
celebrity's name in a commercial . . . . Many people may
assume that when a celebrity's name is used in a television
commercial, the celebrity endorses the product advertised.).
125. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1009 (9th Cir. 2001)

(determining that the third prong [was] a question of fact for the jury because
the defendant used the celebrity plaintiffs' names and pictures "in its catalog
that was intended to sell its goods.").
126. Welles, 279 F.3d at 803 n.26 ("By noting Welles' affirmative actions,
we do not mean to imply that affirmative actions of this type are necessary to
establish nominative use. New Kids sets forth no such requirement, and we do

not impose one here.").
127. MCA Records, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1142-43; See supra text accompanying
note 122.
128. Cairns,292 F.3d at 1154-55.
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did not discuss any evidence of a disclaimer, such as in Brother
29 Kareem Abdul-Jabbar v. General
Records, Inc. v. Jardine,'
Motors Corporation,"' and Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch,'

the courts found a suggestion of sponsorship or endorsement.
Therefore, while the Ninth Circuit may assert that it does not
require an affirmative disclaimer to prove no suggestion of
sponsorship or endorsement, most of its decisions since New Kids
on the Block suggest that the outcome of the third factor is based
on the presence or absence of disclaimers.
VI. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE DESCRIPTIVE FAIR USE TEST AND
THE "NEW KIDS TEST"

Other than the requirements for when descriptive fair use
actually applies, the application of the descriptive fair use test
under § 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act is very similar to the "New
Kids test." "Section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act requires the
defendant to prove three elements to establish a fair use defense: 1.
Defendant's use of the term is not as a trademark or service mark;
2. Defendant uses the term "fairly and in good faith"; and 3.
"Only to describe" its goods or services. ' 132 For comparison
purposes, these will be referred to as the "three prongs" of the
descriptive fair use test.
A. The FirstProngof Descriptive FairUse

The first prong in both fair use tests are only present to
determine which analysis courts should apply in a given trademark
fair use case. Under § 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act, in a trademark
fair use case where the trademark is not used as a trademark,
descriptive fair use is possible. 133 For example, although a senior
user may have a valid trademark for the term "fish-fri," a junior
user is permitted to use the term "fish fry" to describe their own
129.
130.
131.
132.

See Jardine,318 F.3d 900.
SeeAbdul-Jabbar,85 F.3d 407.
See Downing, 265 F.3d 994.
MCCARTHYsupra note 9, § 11:49; See 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(4) (2005).

133. See 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(4).
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coating for fish.'34 On the other hand, under the "New Kids test,"
if the trademark is used as a trademark, and "the product or service
in question [is] one not readily identifiable without use of the
trademark,"' 3 s then there may be nominative fair use. However,
because the Ninth Circuit determined that virtually every
trademark it considered has met the "readily identifiable"
requirement for the first nominative fair use factor, as is discussed
above, if the mark is used as a trademark, then nominative fair use
is possible. Therefore, the first prongs of both the descriptive and
nominative fair use tests simply determine which test applies and
does not help to determine if there was actually a fair use.
B. The Third Prongof Descriptive FairUse
The purpose of the third prong of the descriptive fair use test is
also intended to determine which test to apply in a given trademark
fair use case and only assists the court in determining whether the
use is "other than as a mark." "The purpose of [§33(b)(4)] is to
ensure that the according of monopoly trademark rights over
descriptive marks (upon a showing of acquired secondary
meaning) will not over-broadly deprive society of the use of those
terms in their descriptive sense in commercial communication. "136
In U.S. Shoe Corporationv. Brown Group, Inc., the court went on
to explain how the Defendant used the trademark "feels like a
sneaker" to describe the product and did not use it as a
trademark.1 37 Therefore, descriptive fair use was possible in that

134. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 796 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Zatarain's has no legal
claim to an exclusive right to the original, descriptive sense of the term;
therefore, [the defendants] are still free to use the words 'fish fry' in their
ordinary, descriptive sense.").
135. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
136. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 199 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
137. Id.
(In this case, the defendant use[d] the phrase 'feels like a
sneaker' in a descriptive sense, claiming a virtue of the
product. It essentially restate[d] the key selling claim of
defendant's product - that the Townwalker shoe was designed
specifically to incorporate the comfort of athletic shoes.
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case. Using a similar analysis in National Football League
Properties v. Playoff Corp., the court found that the defendant
used images of football uniforms as a trademark and they were not
descriptive because the uniforms were fanciful or arbitrary. 38 It is
also worth pointing out that, "[a]lthough the Court note[d] that
Defendant could fulfill the New Kids test and that the rationale
underlying that decision [wa]s attractive," it declined to find
nominative fair use in NFL Properties because the Fifth Circuit
had not yet adopted the "New Kids test." 39
The combinations of outcomes above that discuss both the first
and third prong of the descriptive fair use test ("1.
Descriptive/Use Other than as a Mark" in US. Shoe and "4. Not
Descriptive/Use as a Mark" in NFL Properties - See Table III in
Appendix), would appear to be the most logical outcomes when
analyzing the descriptive fair use factors. It would make sense that
phrases could be used either to describe the product/service, or as
a trademark to gain attention for the product/service, but not both.
This is supported by numerous decisions where the court has dealt
with both factors by simply stating that the defendants used the
trademark to describe the product and therefore it could not have
been used as a trademark. 4 ° These analyses suggest that many
courts view these factors as entwined and not mutually exclusive.
However, some courts have specifically stated otherwise.
Moreover, defendant is not using the phrase as an identifier or
trademark to indicate origin or source.).
138. National Football League Props. v. Playoff Corp., 808 F. Supp. 1288,
1293 (N.D. Tex. 1992) ("Because the marks involved here are more in the
nature of fanciful or arbitrary rather than descriptive,...

even if the marks are

used descriptively, the defense remains unobtainable because the marks
themselves are not descriptive marks.").
139. Id. at 1293-94.
140. See WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir.
1991) ("This is not a case where it is difficult to decide whether a defendant is
using particular words primarily as a mark, i.e., as an 'attention getting symbol,'
or primarily as a description."); Wonder Labs, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
728 F. Supp. 1058, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("These factors indicate that the
defendant's use is not a trademark use but rather is a descriptive or explanatory
use."); Clarke v. Joseph H. Dahlkemper, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 441, 442 (W.D.
Penn. 1979) ("These factors.., indicate that the defendants used the phrase 'the
safety ball target game' to describe their game and not as a trademark.").
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When a mark has been used descriptively, it may still function
as a trademark. In Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co.,
the Defendant argued that because they used the Plaintiffs mark
descriptively along with their own trademark, the Defendant's use
14
of the Plaintiffs mark could not be a trademark use as well.'
However, while the Defendant relied on a past "observation [by
the court] that descriptive terms are "unlikely" to function as
trademarks . .. [the court has] never said

. . .

that a descriptive

trademark.' ' 42

term can never function as a
This statement is
supported by numerous decisions where the court found both
descriptive use and use as a trademark.4 4 However, of the three
possible outcomes discussed when considering the first and third
descriptive factors, ("1. Descriptive/Use Other than as a Mark" in
US. Shoe, "4. Not Descriptive/Use as a Mark" in NFL Properties,
"2. Descriptive/Use as a Mark" in Sands, - See Table III in
Appendix), a §33(b)(4) fair use defense has only turned on the
"descriptive" factor in the "1. Descriptive/Use Other than as a
Mark" combination. In the "2. Descriptive/Use as a Mark" and
"4. Not Descriptive/Use as a Mark" combinations, no descriptive
fair use is possible even if the mark is descriptive since it is used
as a mark. In addition, it appears that the courts have based their
decision of descriptive use on their analysis of how the trademark
was depicted in the "1. Descriptive/Use Other than as a Mark"

141. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. The Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 953
(7th Cir. 1992).
142. Id. at 953-54 (citation omitted).
143. See Sands, 978 F.2d at 953-54 ("The evidence of [the defendant's]
advertisements supports the district court's conclusion that [the defendant] used
'Thirst Aid' as a trademark. (The defendant's] ads do not simply use the words
'Thirst Aid' in a sentence describing Gatorade, but as an 'attention-getting
symbol."') (citation omitted); Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240,
1248 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Nor is [the defendant] using the word merely to describe
the size of its PF pen's ballpoint. We conclude that [the defendant] is making a
trademark use of the word 'Auditor's,' and is not immune from liability for
infringement on the basis of the fair use defense."); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover
Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 937-38 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that 'Brew
Nuts' is descriptive and "the record clearly establishes that [the defendant] used
the words 'Brew Nuts' in conjunction with an overflowing stein as a
trademark.").
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combination.'
Therefore it is important to consider the last
possible combination, "3. Not Descriptive Use/Use Other than as
a Mark" to determine whether the "descriptive" requirement is
actually necessary.
The "descriptive" requirement in descriptive fair use is only a
threshold question to determine if the court should consider
whether the mark was "used fairly and in good faith." In EMI
Catalogue P 'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., the
phrase "Swing Swing Swing" was supposed to appear in a
television golf commercial while the famous Benny Goodman
song "Sing, Sing, Sing (With a Swing)" played in the
background.'45 However, due to the high cost of licensing the
song, the Defendant chose to use stock swing music instead.' 46
The court determined that while the Plaintiff did have trademark
rights in the song title, the Defendant's did not use the phrase as a
"'
mark. 47
However, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district
court's finding that the use was descriptive and determined that
148
this was a material issue of fact to be determined on remand.
Therefore, the combination of "3. Not Descriptive Use/Use Other
than as a Mark" may determine whether descriptive fair use
applies and the decision may turn on whether the use is
descriptive.
While the "descriptive" use factor can determine whether to
apply the descriptive fair use test, court analyses of this factor
144. See supra text accompanying note 140.
145. EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228
F.3d 56, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2000).
146. Id. at 60.
147. Id. at 64 ("In this case, defendants did not use the phrase 'Swing Swing

Swing' as a mark ......
148. Id. at 65-66

(Had the single word 'Swing' appeared in the commercial, it
could not be doubted that defendants' use was descriptive.
However, it was error to rule that the alliterative phrase
actually used was necessarily identical to the single

descriptive word.

While 'Swing'

Swing Swing' is not necessarily so ....

is descriptive, 'Swing
A material issue of

fact remains as to whether the use of 'Swing Swing Swing' as
related to the goods or action displayed in
commercial was descriptive.).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol16/iss1/2

the final

34

Regelmann: Trademark Nominative Fair Use: The Relevance of the "New Kids on

20051

TRADEMARK NOMINATIVE FAIR USE

suggests that this is merely a threshold requirement. In other
words, the "descriptive use" factor is often combined with the "use
other than as a mark" factor to determine whether the court should
look at the "used fairly and in good faith" factor. Therefore, the
heart of the descriptive fair use test is the "used fairly and in good
faith" factor.
C. The Second Prong of DescriptiveFair Use
The second prong of the descriptive fair use test is the heart of
the court's fair use analysis and its outcome is what determines
whether there is a descriptive fair use. § 33(b)(4) requires the
mark to be "used fairly and in good faith" for a finding of
descriptive fair use. 149 As "fair use" is defined partly by the term
"used fairly," courts and commentators focus on the "good faith"
of the definition to avoid the circular logic, "there is fair use
because it was used fairly." One leading commentator points out
that "the requirement of "good faith," has not often been
litigated."'50
The courts have discussed a number of factors that may be
considered when determining a defendant's good faith. Where the
defendant breaches an agreement not to use the mark of the
plaintiff, an inference of bad faith may be drawn) 5 ' However,
courts have acknowledged that continued use of a mark after a
plaintiffs claim that the use is infringing is not enough to show a
lack of good faith.'52 There is also no inference of bad faith where

149. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2005).
150. MCCARTHY supra note 9, § 11:49 (referring to the "used fairly and in
good faith" prong, McCarthy only refers to "good faith" and does not refer to
"used fairly").
151. Inst. for Scientific Info., Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Sci. Publishers, Inc.,
931 F.2d 1002, 1009 (3d Cir. 1991) (determining that where the defendant
agreed not to use the term "current contents" in journals, and subsequently used
the term despite the agreement, "an adverse inference of bad faith may be
drawn").
152. Andy Warhol Enters., Inc. v. Time Inc., 700 F. Supp. 760, 766
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding in the court's Polaroidanalysis, "[t]he fact that, prior
to the commencement of the lawsuit, defendant did not abandon its project at
plaintiffs suggestion, does not itself evidence a lack of good faith").
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a subsequent user had full knowledge of the previous use as
similar products will often require similar terms to describe their
features.' 53 Other than violating a specific agreement, most of the
cases discuss what does not result with an inference of "bad faith."
However, some of the factors that result in affirmative inferences
of "good faith" are similar to the second and third prongs of the
"New Kids test."
The analysis of the second prong of the descriptive fair use test
is strikingly similar to the third prong of the "New Kids test." The
Restatement's discussion of descriptive fair use states that there is
no good faith where the subsequent user intends to confuse the
consumer as to the "source or sponsorship."' 54 This is nearly
identical to the third prong of the "New Kids test."'5 5 For example,
in the descriptive fair use case of Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix
Software, Inc., the court found that the Defendant's good faith was
an issue as they might have used the mark to trade on the
Plaintiffs "good will and product identity" even though the
Defendant could have used other phrases.'5 6 In Inst. for Scientific
Info., Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Sci. Publishers, Inc., even though
the court determined that a breach in an agreement not to use a

153. U.S. Shoe, 740 F. Supp. at 199 n.3 ("While it is clear that defendant
designed its marketing strategy in full knowledge of plaintiff's ad campaign,
and with appreciation of the success of plaintiffs sneaker metaphor ... that is
not necessarily evidence that defendant acted with the specific intent to
misappropriate plaintiffs good will."); see also Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1995) ("As [the Defendant] was
fully entitled to use a pine-tree shape descriptively notwithstanding [the
Plaintiffs] use of a tree shape as a mark, the fact that it did so without
consulting counsel has no tendency to show bad faith.").
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28 cmt. d (1995)
("[I]f the evidence establishes that the subsequent user intends to trade on the
good will of the trademark owner by creating confusion as to source or

sponsorship, the use is not in good faith.").
155. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 ("[T]he user must do nothing
that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement
by the trademark holder.").
156. Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1423
(9th Cir. 1984) ("[The Defendant's] good faith is in issue: its choice of the
phrase 'Hi-Res Adventure' when other phrases were available could indicate an
intent to trade on Sierra's good will and product identity.").
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mark could result in a finding of bad faith, the court's rationale
was based on the "possible inference that defendants intended to
trade upon and dilute the good will represented by the [Plaintiffs]
mark."' 57 Clearly, the courts look to whether the subsequent use of
a mark will suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark
holder when determining "good faith" in their descriptive fair use
analyses.
The analysis of the second prong of the descriptive fair use test
is also strikingly similar to the second prong of the "New Kids
test." Courts have looked to the copying of typestyle and labels of
junior users to determine whether there is a "good faith" use under
the descriptive fair use test. In Venetianaire Corp. ofAm. v. A & P
Corp., the Second Circuit found no good faith when the Defendant
used a trademark and wrapper nearly identical to that of the
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit found good faith
Plaintiff's.'
in Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc. where the
Defendants consciously packaged their products to avoid
confusing the consumers as to the source.'59 This is very similar to
the second prong of the "New Kids test."' 6 ° In addition, this 1is
6
similar to the nominative fair use analyses in Volkswagenwerk '
and Toho 16 where the courts looked at the extent of use of the
157. Inst.for Scientific Info., 931 F.2d at 1010.
158. Venetianaire Corp. of Am. v. A & P Imp. Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1083 (2d
Cir. 1970)
([A]lthough the district court found it unnecessary to
'consider whether defendant's use was 'fair' and in 'good
faith" in determining an infringing usage, the record makes it
plain that defendant, knowing of plaintiffs packaging,
adopted a trademark and wrapper almost identical to
plaintiffs. That fact eliminates any doubt that defendant was
not entitled to claim fair use of a descriptive term as a defense
to infringement of plaintiffs trademark.).
159. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 796 ("[The Defendants] consciously packaged
and labeled their products in such a way as to minimize any potential confusion
in the minds of consumers.").
160. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 ("[O]nly so much of the mark
or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or
service.").
161. See supra text accompanying note 114.
162. See supra text accompanying note 115.
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logos and the use of a similar style of lettering. By analyzing the
use of similar features on wrappers in determining "good faith,"
the courts are looking at how much of the mark is used that is
reasonably necessary to identify the product.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in KP Permanent,on
remand from the Supreme Court, listed a number of factors to
consider when determining whether a use is fair. Three of the
factors include whether alternative descriptive terms are available,
the extent of the use of the term before the mark's registration, and
"the degree of likely confusion."' 63 These three factors are
strikingly similar to all three of the "New Kids factors." Future
litigation based on the Ninth Circuit's new "descriptive factors"
may lead to even more similarities between nominative and
descriptive fair use. Both tests consist of threshold questions that
determine which test should apply. However, in both tests, the
courts ultimately look at the use of the marks and determine
whether the mark was used to trade on the good will of a prior

user. Given that both tests result in the same analysis, it is
arguable that one form of fair use should be eliminated.
VII. DISCUSSION OF THE NEED FOR NOMINATIVE

FAIR USE

A. Is Nominative Fair Use Necessary?

1. Nominative FairUse Cases with a Classic FairUse Look

A leading commentator on trademark law has described a well163. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d
596, 609 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Among the relevant factors for consideration by the jury in
determining the fairness of the use are the degree of likely

confusion, the strength of the trademark, the descriptive
nature of the term for the product or service being offered by
[the Plaintiff] and the availability of alternative descriptive
terms, the extent of the use of the term prior to the registration

of the trademark, and any differences among the times and
contexts in which [the Plaintiff] has used the term.).
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known nominative fair use case as being resolved with a classic
fair use defense. In Welles, the Defendant and the court clearly
relied on nominative fair use.' 64 There is no citation to § 33(b)(4)
of the Lanham Act in Welles and no discussion of whether the
However, in
mark was "used fairly and in good faith."
McCarthy's treatise on the fair use doctrine, McCarthy describes
the Welles case as an example of descriptive fair use.'65 The
commentary states, "[t]he court held that defendant Welles's use
of the words "Playmate of the Year 1981" in her title on her
homepage and "Playboy Playmate of the Year 1981" and
"Playmate of the Year 1981" in her advertising banners fell within
the classic fair use defense."16' 6 However, McCarthy's treatise is

not the only place where a nominative fair use analysis is confused
due to its descriptive fair use "look."
In addition to a commentator confusing the tests, the restatement
has described the "good faith" analysis of descriptive fair use by
discussing all three nominative fair use factors. First, "if there are
other terms equally suited to the legitimate commercial needs of
the subsequent user, the prominent use of any form of the
particular term in which trademark rights exist may in some
circumstances support an inference of bad faith." '67 This is nearly
identical to the first prong of the "New Kids test."' 68 Second,
"[c]opying aspects of another's trademark that are unrelated to its
descriptive significance, such as lettering style or color, can

indicate bad faith, as does evidence of other similarities in labeling
or packaging that contribute to the likelihood that the subsequent

164. Welles, 279 F.3d at 800 ("Except for the use of [the plaintiffs]
protected terms in the wallpaper of [the defendant's] website, we conclude that
[the defendants'] uses of [the plaintiff's] trademarks are permissible, nominative
uses."). Id. (emphasis added).
165. 2 MCCARTHY, supranote 9, § 11:48 n.17.1.
166. Id. (emphasis added) (adding, "[h]er public persona is based on these
titles and ... [they] accurately describe her .... ).

167.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 28 cmt. d (1995)

(emphasis added).
168. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 ("[T]he product or service in
question must be one not readily identifiable without the use of the

trademark.").
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use will confuse prospective purchasers."' 69 This is similar to the
second prong of the "New Kids test"'7 ° and its subsequent analysis
in Toho.'7 ' Third, "if the evidence establishes that the subsequent

user intends to trade on the good will of the trademark owner by
creating confusion as to source or sponsorship, the use is not in
good faith."' 72 This is very similar to the third prong of the "New
Kids test."' 73 In essence, the Restatement suggests that in order to

determine the core factor of descriptive fair use, courts are
basically applying a nominative fair use test. While it appears that
nominative fair use analysis has been referred to as descriptive fair
use on multiple occasions, classic fair use has also been described
as a nominative fair use.
2. Classic Fair Use Cases with a Nominative FairUse Look
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has described a well-known
descriptive fair use case as a nominative fair use matter. In
WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Association, the First Circuit clearly
relied on descriptive fair use when determining whether a
television station could use the phrase "Boston Marathon" in
promoting the station's marathon coverage.' 74 Although the First
Circuit decided WCVB-TV almost a year and a half before the
Ninth Circuit established the "New Kids test," there is no

169.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 28 cmt. d (1995)

(emphasis added).
170. New Kids on,the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 ("[O]nly so much of the mark

or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or
service.").
171. See supra text accompanying note 115.

172.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 28 cmt. d (1995)

(emphasis added).
173. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 ("[T]he user must do nothing
that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement
by the trademark holder.").
174. WCVB-TV, 926 F.2d at 46 (citing §33(b)(4) and the well-known
Zatarains descriptive fair use case, the court stated that, "[in technical

trademark jargon, the use of words for descriptive purposes is called a 'fair use,'
and the law usually permits it even if the words themselves also constitute a

trademark").

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol16/iss1/2

40

Regelmann: Trademark Nominative Fair Use: The Relevance of the "New Kids on

2005]

TRADEMARK NOMINATIVE FAIR USE

discussion of the application of any form of nominative fair use.'75
The Restatement also cites WCVB-TV as an example of descriptive
fair use.'76 However, the Ninth Circuit has cited WCVB-TV as an
example of the nominativefair use doctrine. In Jardine,the court

cited WCVB-TV as a nominative fair use case to "illustrate the
distinction" between when descriptive and nominative fair use
should apply.'77

The Ninth Circuit also uses the "Boston

Marathon" as an example of the first factor in the "New Kids
test."' 78 It is not clear from these discussions whether WCVB-TV
should be a nominative fair use case or not.
There are a few explanations for why there are different
opinions as to whether WCVB-TV should be a nominative or
descriptive fair use case. On one hand, maybe WCVB-TV would
clearly be a nominative fair use case only after the introduction of
the "New Kids test." However, the First Circuit failed to cite the
New Kids on the Block pre-cursor, Volkswagenwerk, or discuss any

form of nominative use in its decision.'79 In addition, the court
specifically stated that there was evidence that the mark was used
"primarily as a description" and little evidence that the mark was
used "primarily as a mark."'"8 As the First Circuit had no interest
in discussing nominative fair use before the "New Kids test," the
175. See id. at 42.

176.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 28 Reporter's Note,

cmt. c. (1995) (asserting that WCVB-TV shows that "[e]ven a prominent use of a
descriptive term that is another's trademark may qualify as a fair use").
177. Jardine,318 F.3d at 904
(To illustrate [the distinction between where descriptive and

nominative fair use is appropriate], we cited a number of cases
that applied the nominative fair use analysis.... In [WCVBTV], a television station referred to and made broadcasts of the
trademarked "Boston Marathon." In all these cases, the
defendant used the plaintiff's trademark to refer to the
plaintiff's product, and therefore the nominative fair use
analysis applied.") (citations omitted).
178. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 ("It is no more reasonably
possible, however, to refer to the New Kids as an entity than it is to refer to the
Chicago Bulls, Volkswagens or the Boston Marathon without using the

trademark.").
179. See WCVB-TV, 926 F.2d at 42.
180. Id. at 46.
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Ninth Circuit's statements on the matter can only be read as an
explanation of how the Ninth Circuit would have handled WCVBTV should the case have appeared in the Ninth Circuit after the
New Kids on the Block decision. On the other hand, the
discrepancy could simply be a mistake by the court. This would
be a great example of judicial irony since the Ninth Circuit
intended to clarify the differences between the two types of fair
use and in the end, confused the tests thus adding to the
uncertainty. Perhaps the analysis of the WCVB-TV decision
simply illustrates that courts don't really need two distinct fair use
tests and they should simply apply a unified fair use test in all
trademark matters.
B. Some Proposalsfor Life After The New Kids on the Block
In light of the striking similarities between the two trademark
fair use tests, I propose that the distinction between "nominative"
and "descriptive" fair use should be eliminated so courts can more
accurately determine when a mark is used fairly, and trademark
users can understand when and how they are permitted to use such
marks. While this may not have changed the outcome of how past
trademark fair use cases would have turned out, it will make the
trademark fair use process less confusing and clearly delineate
how marks may be used in the future.
1. A Modest Proposal:Modify DescriptiveFairUse in § 33(b)(4)
of the Lanham Act
To eliminate the distinction between "descriptive" and
"nominative" fair use, I propose the removal of the phrases
"otherwise than as a mark" and "descriptive of and" from §
33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act. This would eliminate the need for the
nominative fair use test and the only trademark fair use defense
under § 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act would read:
That the use of the name, term, or device charged to
be an infringement is a use of the party's individual
name in his own business, or of the individual name
of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or
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device which is used fairly and in good faith only to
describe the goods or services of such party, or their
geographic origin.' 8
In addition, the term "describe the goods or services" should be
interpreted broadly to encompass situations where the defendant
uses the plaintiffs mark to describe his own product and situations
where the defendant uses the plaintiff's mark to describe the
plaintiffs product where the ultimate goal is to describe his own
product. 82
'
This fair use test removes the threshold questions from the
descriptive and nominative fair use tests and allows courts and
users to focus on whether the mark is used in good faith to
describe the goods or services. Courts will ultimately have to
determine what factors result in an inference of good faith and
what factors result in an inference of bad faith. However, this will
be relatively straightforward since courts have considered some
"good faith" factors in past descriptive and nominative fair use
cases. Ultimately, the courts and trademark users will spend more
of their resources considering whether the use was actually fair
and less time and energy on which test should apply. This test will
focus on the issue at the heart of trademark fair use: Did the
subsequent user apply the mark in an attempt to exploit the
goodwill of the trademark holder?

181. See supra text accompanying note 12 for §33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act

without alteration.
182. This interpretation is intended to avoid confusion as to what
"description" entails. As discussed in Cairns, this encompasses both the
descriptive and nominative fair use standards of how to determine what is
included in "description." See Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1151

(The nominative fair use analysis is appropriate where a
defendant has used the plaintiffs mark to describe the
plaintiff's product, even if the defendant's ultimate goal is to
describe his own product. Conversely, the classic fair use
analysis is appropriate where a defendant has used the
plaintiff's mark only to describe his own product, and not at
all to describe the plaintif'sproduct.).
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2. A Modest Alternative Proposal:Apply Conceptsfrom the EU
TrademarkDirective to the Lanham Act
In the alternative, to eliminate the distinction between
"descriptive" and "nominative" fair use, I propose the removal of §
33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act and its replacement with a provision
similar to Article 6(1) of the EU Trade Marks Directive
(89/104/EEC). Article 6(1) states:
The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to
prohibit a third party from using, in the course of
trade, his own name or address; indications
concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended
purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of
production of goods or of rendering of the service,
or other characteristics of goods or services; the
trade mark where it is necessary to indicate the
intended purpose of a product or service, in
particular as accessories or spare parts; provided he
uses them in accordance with honest practices in
industrial or commercial matters.'8 3
A provision similar to article 6(l)(c) would replace the need for
descriptive and nominative fair use. This would permit the use of
trademarks where it is necessary to clearly identify the product or
service to the public while making sure that users are not taking
advantage of the good will of trademark owners. While courts will
clearly have to define the scope of the terms "necessary" and
"honest practices," the European Court of Justice has recently set
out straightforward factors and definitions that are similar to
factors considered by courts in the United States.' 84 Like the first
183. First Council Directive 89/104/EEC, art. 6(1), 1988 O.J. (L 40) 1
(emphasis added).
184. Case C-228/03, Gillette Co. v. LA-Labs. Ltd Oy. 2005 E.C.J. CELEX
LEXIS 77 (Mar. 17, 2005)
(Use of the trade mark by a third party who is not its owner is
necessary in order to indicate the intended purpose of a
product marketed by that third party where such use in
practice constitutes the only means of providing the public
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proposal, this will allow courts and trademark users to spend more
of their resources considering whether the use was actually fair
and less time and energy on which test should apply.
C. Conclusion
In conclusion, the application of descriptive and nominative
trademark fair use defenses are extremely similar after the recent
8 5 The analysis of each
Supreme Court decision in KP Permanent.'
test is so similar that numerous courts have confused their
application and they cannot agree on which test should apply for a
given fact pattern.'86 Since their analyses have converged and
resulted in confusion, the Lanham Act should be amended so
courts and trademark users can more accurately determine how
marks can be protected, and what uses are fair.'87

with comprehensible and complete information on that
intended purpose in order to preserve the undistorted system
of competition in the market for that product ....
[U]se of the
trade mark will not comply with honest practices in industrial
or commercial matters where, first, it is done in such a manner
that it may give the impression that there is a commercial
connection between the reseller and the trade mark proprietor.
Nor may such use affect the value of the trade mark by taking
unfair advantage of its distinctive character or repute ...
[A]ccount should be taken of the overall presentation of the
product marketed by the third party, particularly the
circumstances in which the mark of which the third party is
not the owner is displayed in that presentation, the
circumstances in which a distinction is made between that
mark and the mark or sign of the third party, and the effort
made by that third party to ensure that consumers distinguish
its products from those of which it is not the trade mark
owner. . . . [T]he condition of 'honest use' within the
meaning of Article 6(l)(c) . . . constitutes in substance the
expression of a duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate
interests of the trade mark owner.) (citations omitted).
185. See Supra Section III.
186. See Supra Section VI.
187. See Supra Section VII(B).
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APPENDIX

Table I

Circuits that Apply "New
Kids"
Nominative Fair Use Analysis
2 nd Circuit - Chambers v. Time
Warner

Circuits That Do Not Apply
"New Kids" Nominative Fair
Use Analysis
3 rd Circuit - Century 21 Real
Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree,
Inc.
Circuit
National
5 'hCircuit - Pebble Beach Co. v 4 th
Tour 18
Federation of the Blind v.
Loompanics Enterprises
th
Circuit
Brother
Records
v.
9
6 th Circuit - Paccar v. Telescan
Jardine

Table II
Before 2004 KP Permanent Supreme Court Decision
Circuits Where Likelihood of Circuits Where Likelihood of
Confusion Barred Descriptive Confusion
Did
Not
Bar
Fair Use Defense
Descriptive Fair Use Defense
h
Circuit - Cosmetically
5 t Circuit - Zatarains v. Oak
2 nd
Grove Smokehouse
Sealed
Industries
v.
Chesebrough-Pond's
6th Circuit - Paccar v. Telescan 4 T Circuit Shakespeare
Technologies
Company v. Silstar
- KP Permanent 7 th Circuit - Sunmark v. Ocean
9 th Circuit
Make-Up v. Lasting Impression Spray Cranberries
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Table III
Four Possible Outcomes of Two Descriptive Fair Use Factors:
"Use Other than as a Mark" and "Descriptive" Use
Outcomes that May Result in DescriptiveFair Use
1) Descriptive/Use Other than as a Mark
- U.S. Shoe - Use of "Feels like a sneaker" in a women's shoe
advertisement
- Clarke - Use of "safety ball" on packaging of ball game
WCVB-TV - Use of "Boston Marathon" on television
broadcast
- Wonder Labs - Use of "The Dentists' Choice" on toothpaste
Outcomes that CannotResult in Descriptive Fair Use
2) Descriptive/Use as a Mark
- Sands - Use of "Thirst-Aid" on beverage container
- Beer Nuts - Use of "Brew Nuts" on peanut packaging
- Lindy Pen - Use of "Auditor's" on pen
3) Not Descriptive/Use Other than as a Mark
EMI Catalogue* - Use of "Swing Swing Swing" in golf
commercial
(*Descriptive use was a materialissue offact to be determinedon remand)

4) Not Descriptive/Use as a Mark
- NFL Properties - Use of images of football players in NFL
uniforms on trading cards
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